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This paper proposes a model of altruism with endogenous labor supply.
A full characterization of the family’s choices of consumption and leisure
is provided. Initially, work e¤ort is assumed to be publicly observed; this
assumption is later relaxed, allowing for privately observed actions. It is
shown that the “redistributive neutrality” property commonly associated
with altruism holds only with respect to non-labor income sources. Failing
to control for labor income amounts to an inadequate speci…cation of em-
pirical tests of the neutrality hypothesis. Further, when e¤ort is privately
observed, the need to convey incentives causes neutrality to break down
entirely.
Keywords: Altruism, endogenous labor supply, private information, redis-
tributive neutrality.
JEL Classi…cation: D13, D82, J22.
1. Introduction
In the altruismliterature, it hasbeen frequently postulated that the distribution of
resources within the family should not a¤ect the allocation of consumption across
family members (see, for example, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ [1]). This con-
clusion, the very essence of Ricardian Equivalence (Barro [5] and Becker [6]), stems
¤Section 5 borrows considerably from my University of Chicago dissertation.
yCEMFI. I am grateful to Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and my colleagues at CEMFI, particularly
Pedro Mira and Javier Suárez, for very helpful comments. Any errors are my own.from the fact that, in altruistic families, resources are pooled and family members
face a common budget constraint. Consequently, as long as total resources are
constant, the family may attain its preferred consumption allocation and the way
in which the total is decomposed into parcels, representing the contribution of in-
dividual family members, should not matter. The invariance of familial resource
allocation to the distribution of resources within the family has been empirically
tested in a number of ways. One implication of the theory, for families engaging
in …nancial transfers, is that taking one dollar from the transfer recipient’s income
and adding it to the donor’s income should be compensated by an increment of
exactly one dollar in the initial transfer. Therefore, the initial consumption al-
location would not be displaced. This implication will be referred throughout as
“redistributive neutrality.” Contrary to the predictions of the theory, empirical
evidence has unanimously rejected such a fact: while transfers display the pattern
predicted by altruism, ‡owing from richer family members to poorer ones, they
do not neutralize income redistribution (for the most complete treatment on this
issue, see Altonji et al. [3]).
This paper proposes a model of altruism with endogenous labor supply. First,
I revise the standard labor-leisure choice of an individual consumer. This con-
sumer later impersonates the “child” member of the altruistic family, once joined
together with the parental …gure and decision maker of the Barro-Becker litera-
ture. Following the Barro-Becker approach, I initially con…ne all decision making
ability to the parent: he may choose consumption and the time to spent at work
of all family members. The introduction of endogenous labor supply brings an
important quali…cation to the implications of income redistribution within the
family. In fact, the neutrality of income redistribution applies only with respect
to non-labor income sources: exogenous income sources are perfect substitutes in
providing utils; changes in wage rates, on the other hand, induce readjustments in
labor force participation. To the extent that family members earn di¤erent wages
and spend di¤erent amounts of time in the labor market, a one dollar change in
their labor income induces di¤erent adjustments in terms of labor force partici-
pation. This fact, alone, would su¢ce to break “redistributive neutrality.” It is
worth noting that this holds regardless of whether or not utility is separable in
consumption and leisure, as changes in wages still induce adjustments in labor
choices in the separability case.
I proceed by relaxing the centralized decision making ability, allowing the
child to chose her preferred e¤ort level and simultaneously preventing the parent
from imposing negative transfers on the child. I analyze the strategic interaction
2between parent and child and characterize the unique Nash-equilibrium of this
static game. The outcome of the game with two decision makers replicates the
Barro-Becker choices when transfers are strictly positive. When transfers are zero,
the child chooses e¤ort just like the typical consumer deciding between labor and
leisure, and the parent simply consumes his endowment. When positive transfers
take place, the model maintains the neutrality result concerning redistribution of
non-labor income sources, provided transfers are still positive after redistribution
takes place. As before, income redistribution with respect to wages is an ill-
de…ned experiment. When transfers are zero, income redistribution is e¤ective:
taking one dollar from one family member and giving it to another, when transfers
remain at zero, implies that this additional dollar will be entirely spent in higher
consumption and less working time by the recipient. Other implications of this
model include di¤erences in the wage and income elasticities of consumption and
labor supply, across transfer regimes. For example, the model predicts a less
elastic response of labor supply to changes in the child’s income when transfers
are positive.
Finally, I consider the possibility that the child’s e¤ort is privately observed
by her alone. As is standard in agency theory, I model the child’s income as being
drawn from a probability distribution conditional on the e¤ort level she exerted.
It is shown that income redistribution is not neutral, in this case. In fact, di¤erent
realizations of the child’s income convey di¤erent inference concerning the likeli-
hood that the child put in the e¤ort level which the principal (the parent) wishes
to implement. This di¤erent inference is the source of neutrality breakdown: in
the redistribution experiment of comparing the initial consumption allocation to
one where the child’s income is subtracted of one dollar and the parent’s income is
incremented by the same amount, the di¤erences in the child’s income additionally
convey di¤erences in information. In this sense, they are not neutral.
The last section of the paper is devoted to confronting results in the empirical
literature with the predictions of the model. I make two di¤erent sets of remarks.
Under the assumption that families have — in the real world — the ability to
adjust labor supply in response to income and wage changes, testing redistribu-
tive neutrality by the vague experiment of comparing familial resource allocation
before and after income redistribution is an inadequate procedure. As stated
above, endogenous labor supply implies that this experiment is only a proper test
of neutrality when applied to non-labor income sources. Consequently, unless the
income source is correctly speci…ed and wages are held …xed in the comparison,
one should not expect neutrality to hold. The models proposed in this paper
3provide an expression relating the actual empirical estimates and the parameter
of interest, from the point of view of redistributive neutrality. These two num-
bers di¤er only when labor supply responds to changes of wages and income. As
shown below, it is possible that the empirical rejection of redistributive neutrality
stems from a su¢ciently large labor supply elasticity with respect to the wage
rate. The other set of comments concerns additional reasons for properly de…ned
tests of neutrality to reject the null. In the setup of the agency model of section 5,
changes in the child’s total income can be interpreted as changes in her wage rate.
Even in this case, when changes in “wages” are not associated with adjustments
in the labor supply, it is shown that the typical trade-o¤ between insurance and
incentives causes neutrality to break down. Under mild assumptions, the theo-
retical prediction for transfer responses after income redistribution (transfers are
expected to compensate only partially the one dollar redistribution experiment)
corresponds, at least qualitatively, to the empirical …ndings.
2. The Child’s Problem
In this section, I present the labor-leisure choice faced by a consumer who will
later impersonate the “child” member of the altruistic family. Independent con-
sideration of the child’s problem makes clear what assumptions on the child’s
utility function are needed to require normality of consumption and leisure, say,
and what role these assumptions will play later, when the family is enlarged to
consider the parent.
2.1. The Model
All variables in this section have subscript c, indicating they refer to the “child.”
Although such a distinction is unnecessary here, this is intended to make notation
consistent across sections. The child has one unit of time she may devote to work
or leisure. Time spent at work is denoted ec whereas the child’s consumption is
written cc, cc 2 R+. Preferences are given by Uc:
Uc = u(cc;1 ¡ec);
where u(¢) is C2, strictly increasing and strictly concave with respect to both
arguments. The direct utility function u(¢) is also assumed to verify, for e 2 [0;1],
u1(0;1 ¡e) = 1, limc!1 u1(c;1 ¡ e) = 0, and for c 2 R+, u2(c;0) = 1.
4When going into the labor market, the child receives wage wc. She also has
exogenous income Ic. Her problem is then to
max
ec2[0;1]
u(Ic + wcec;1 ¡ ec):
The …rst-order condition is:
u1(Ic + wcec;1 ¡ ec)wc ¡ u2(Ic + wcec;1 ¡ ec) · 0. (2.1)
Although there is nothing to preclude the optimal choice of labor time to be
not to work at all (ec = 0), I will assume throughout that this corner solution is
not reached so that (2.1) always holds at equality. Formally ignoring the corner
solution makes the formulation of the familial decision problem, in the sections
to follow, much less cumbersome (as well as the proofs concerning the properties
of optimal transfers, consumption and e¤ort). For the purpose of analyzing the
response of parental transfers to changes in income or wages, taken up below, this
carries no loss in generality.
Concerning the child’s utility function, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 For all (Ip;wc) 2 R2
++ and all e¤ort levels ec 2 [0;1), i) u11w2
c ¡
2u12wc + u22 < 0, ii) u21 ¡ u11wc > 0, iii) u12wc ¡ u22 > 0.
Part i) of assumption 1 ensures that the child’s second-order conditions are
satis…ed (condition i) is su¢cient for a maximum). Assumption 1, parts i) and
ii) ensure that leisure is a normal good, while i) and iii) deliver the normality of
consumption.
Assumption 2 Forall (Ip;wc) 2 R2
++ and all e¤ortlevelsec 2 [0;1), (u21 ¡ u11wc)ec¡
u1 · 0.
Assumption 2 ensures that work e¤ort varies positively with the wage. In turn,
this guarantees that consumption is also higher when the wage is higher.
The previous assumptions are, in a sense, too restrictive, since they have been
imposed as global conditions. In fact, assuming that leisure and consumption are
normal goods, for example, should be a local condition, holding “close” to optimal
choices of e¤ort. In the statement of assumptions 1 and 2, however, it has been
assumed that the required local conditions also hold for any possibly non-optimal
choice of e¤ort. I have chosen this restrictive conditions for simplicity. The global
5form of assumptions 1 and 2 will only be used to ensure that the solutions to
the optimization problems in sections 2 and 3 are unique, as well as in the proof
of lemma 4.3 (to deliver uniqueness and stability of the Nash-equilibrium of the
game played between parent and child). For all other results, “local” statements
of these assumptions su¢ce.
The following lemmas are straightforward implications of the properties of the
utility function u(¢) and the previous assumptions.
Lemma 2.1. The optimal e¤ort choice ec = ec (Ic;wc) is a continuously di¤eren-
tiable function in all arguments1. Moreover, ec;1 < 0 and ec;2 > 0.
Lemma 2.2. The optimal consumption choice cc (Ic;wc) is a continuously di¤er-
entiable function in all arguments. Moreover, cc;1 > 0 and cc;2 > 0.
Expressions for the derivatives of e¤ort and consumption with respect to in-
come and wages are given in the appendix.
3. The Barro-Becker Model with E¤ort
This section looks back at the model of the family introduced by Barro [5] and
Becker [6], extensively used in the altruism literature2. In a static environment,
I enlarge the model to include non-separable e¤ort choices. The model is used
to analyze how the single-decision maker — the parental …gure of this altruism
literature — divides total income among family members, and the properties of
the inherent transfers which put the consumption allocation in place. The novelty,
in this section, is the ability conveyed to the same decision maker of selecting the
e¤ort intensity of family members, and the e¤ect of work intensity choices on the
optimal transfer, consumption and e¤ort allocations.
The results of this section will be used as a benchmark with which to compare
the properties of familial equilibrium allocations with those emerging from more
elaborate models of familial interaction, discussed in sections 4 and 5.
1If e¤ort had been allowed not to be strictly positive, then for some income values and wage
rates, the function describing the optimal choice of e¤ort would have a kink. Consequently, it
would only be di¤erentiable away from those income and wage pairs. The derivatives presented
here can be interpreted as the derivatives of the more general e¤ort function for income and
wage rates such that the optimal choice of hours is strictly positive. Since optimal consumption
choices inherit the properties of e¤ort, the same remark applies to the statement of the next
lemma. This is also true of the results presented in lemmas 3.1 through 3.4, and 4.1.
2For an excelent survey of the altruism literature, see Laitner [15].
63.1. The Model
Consider a family formed of parent and child, the child being the individual de-
scribed in section 2. For simplicity, it is assumed that only the child works (con-
sequently, only the child su¤ers disutility from work). The subscript p indicates
parental variables. Let the constant ¸ take values in [0:5;1]. Given a familial
consumption pair (cp;cc), and the child’s e¤ort ec, the parent’s total utility Up is:
Up = ¸U (cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc;1 ¡ ec),
where thedirect utility function U (¢) is C2, strictly increasingand strictly concave.
Further, it is assumed that U0 (0) = 1 and limc!1 U0 (c) = 0. The properties of
the child’s direct utility function u(¢) have been stated above.
The parent receives exogenous income Ip whereas the child’s total endowment
is the sum of the exogenous component Ic and the labor payments wcec. Given Ip,
Ic and the market wage wc, the parent chooses the (possibly negative) amount of
resources he may transfer to the child, denoted Tp, as well as the child’s working
hours, ec. The child’s consumption is then:
cc = Ic + wcec + Tp; (3.1)
while the parent consumes
cp = Ip ¡ Tp. (3.2)
The transfer and working hours solve
max
Tp;ec
¸U (Ip ¡ Tp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ec):
First-order conditions are:
¸U
0(Ip ¡ Tp) = (1 ¡ ¸)u1(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec) (3.3)
u1(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec)wc = u2(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec): (3.4)
Let Tp (Ip;Ic;wc) and ec (Ip;Ic;wc) denote solutions to (3.3) and (3.4). From
the properties of U (¢) and u(¢), the optimal choices of transfers and e¤ort are
continuously di¤erentiable functionsof the arguments(Ip;Ic;wc). Substituting the
optimal choices in (3.1) and (3.2), we get the corresponding familial consumption
choices, cc (Ip;Ic;wc) and cp (Ip;Ic;wc).
Let A denote the Hessian matrix associated with the parental problem. This
matrix and its determinant are derived in the appendix. I make the following
assumptions:
7Assumption 3 For all (Ip;Ic;wc) 2 R3
++, all transfers Tp 2 R, Tp < Ip, and all
e¤ort levels ec 2 [0;1), u11u22 ¡ u2
12 > 0.
Assumption 3 serves two purposes. Together with assumption 1, part i), it
ensures that jAj > 0. From the properties of u(¢) and U (¢), we know that the
system of …rst-order conditions (3.3) and (3.4) has a solution. jAj being positive
implies that this solution is a maximizer. From the fact that these assumptions
hold globally (for all endowment and wage rate values as well as e¤ort choices), it
follows that the solution is also unique. Assumption 3 additionally ensures that
parental consumption is a normal good.
Assumption 4 For all (Ip;Ic;wc) 2 R3
++, all transfers Tp 2 R, Tp < Ip, and all
e¤ort levels ec 2 [0;1), ¡u1((1 ¡ ¸)u11 + ¸U00) ¡ ¸U00ec (u11wc ¡ u21) > 0.
Assumption 4 ensures that the parent will choose longer working hours for the
child when her wage goes up.
Assumption 5 For all (Ip;Ic;wc) 2 R3
++, all transfers Tp 2 R, Tp < Ip, and all
e¤ort levels ec 2 [0;1), ¸U00 [(u22 ¡ u12wc)ec ¡ u1wc] ¡ u1u12(1 ¡¸) > 0.
Assumption 5 ensures that the child’s consumption goes up with her wage.
The comment made in section 2 concerning the global and, therefore, restric-
tive nature of the assumptions stated there applies to assumptions 3 through 5,
as well.
3.2. Results
The following properties of the family’s optimal choices are formally shown in the
appendix.
Lemma 3.1. The optimal parental transfer Tp (Ip;Ic;wc) is a continuously di¤er-
entiable function in all arguments, with Tp;1 > 0, Tp;2 < 0 and Tp;3 < 0. Moreover,
Tp;1 ¡ Tp;2 = 1.
Lemma 3.2. The child’s optimal e¤ort ec (Ip;Ic;wc) is a continuously di¤eren-
tiable function in all arguments, with ec;1 < 0, ec;2 < 0 and ec;3 > 0. Moreover,
ec;1 = ec;2.
8Lemma 3.3. Optimal parental consumption cp = cp (Ip;Ic;wc) is a continuously
di¤erentiable function in all arguments, with cp;1 > 0, cp;2 > 0 and cp;3 > 0.
Moreover, cp;1 = cp;2.
Lemma 3.4. The child’s optimal consumption cc = cc (Ip;Ic;wc) is a continu-
ously di¤erentiable function in all arguments, with cc;1 > 0, cc;2 > 0 and cc;3 > 0.
Moreover, cc;1 = cc;2.
The fact that Tp;1 ¡ Tp;2 = 1 holds implies that, for a given wage wc, only
the total (Ip + Ic) matters for familial resource allocation. For a constant wc, the
e¤ect of subtracting one dollar from the child’s exogenous income Ic and adding it
to the parent’s Ip will be a transfer increment of exactly the same amount, leaving
familial consumption and e¤ort choices unchanged. Consequently, redistribution
of exogenous income across family members does not a¤ect the optimal choices
of consumption and e¤ort. In other words, Ip and Ic are perfect substitutes in
providing utils. This is con…rmed by the fact that the derivatives of consumption
and e¤ort are identical with respect to either source of exogenous income (e.g.
cc;1 = cc;2).
The property Tp;1¡Tp;2 = 1 is the redistributive neutrality result. Since wages
typically induce adjustments in labor force participation, there is no reason to
expect consumption and e¤ort choices to remain constant after wage variation. A
detailed discussion of this issue is provided in section 6.2.
It is important to point out that the result Tp;1¡Tp;2 = 1 is obtained simply by
di¤erentiating the system of …rst-order conditions (3.3) and (3.4). Consequently,
it only relies on the optimality of that solution, delivered by assumption 1, part
i), and assumption 3. The same applies to the results ec;1 = ec;2, cp;1 = cp;2 and
cc;1 = cc;2.
4. A Family with Two Decision Makers
The Barro-Becker model had all the decision making ability concentrated on the
parent. The purpose of this section is to modify this feature of the choice process.
Here, I model the interaction between parent and child in a strategic form, as a
static game3. The child decides on the amount of hours to work and the parent
chooses transfers. I maintain the utility functions just as before, so that it is also
3Lindbeck and Weibull [16] …rst modelled the interaction between two altruistic agents as a
game.
9natural now to prevent the parent from imposing negative transfer upon a sel…sh
child.
It is shown that this static game has a unique Nash-equilibrium. Moreover, as
a function of the exogenous income pairs and wage rate (Ip;Ic;wc), the outcome
of this game between parent and child replicates exactly the choices of the Barro-
Becker framework, when transfers are strictly positive. When transfers are zero,
the child continues to act like the decision maker of section 2 and the parent
simply consumes the totality of his endowment.
4.1. The Model
The setup of the model is the same of section 3, and all the variables de…ned
similarly. For convenience, the expressions for the parent and the child’s total
utility are reproduced below:
Up = ¸U (cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc;1 ¡ ec),
Uc = u(cc;1 ¡ec).
Parent and child interaction is nowmodelled as a non-cooperative, static game.
The parent chooses a non-negative transfer to the child, Tp, also constrained not
to exceed parental resources: Tp 2 [0;Ip]. The child’s action is the amount of time
to spend at work, ec, constrained to lie in the unit interval: ec 2 [0;1]. Given
income values (Ip;Ic), wage rate wc and actions (Tp;ec), consumption values are
determined as before. The game ¡(Ip;Ic;wc) = ffp;cg;fTp;ecgfUp;Ucgg is now
fully speci…ed.






Ip ¡ ~ Tp
´
+ (1 ¡ ¸)u
³




fu(Ic + w~ ec + Tp;1 ¡ ~ ec)g:
The optimal choices of parent and child, conditioning on the other player’s
action, solve the following …rst-order conditions:
¡¸U
0(Ip ¡ Tp) + (1 ¡¸)u1(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec) · 0; (4.1)
where (4.1) holds at equality when Tp > 0, and
u1(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec)wc = u2(Ic + wcec + Tp;1 ¡ ec): (4.2)
10Comparison of (4.1) and (4.2) with (3.3) and (3.4) reveals that the choices of
e¤ort and transfers, when the latter are positive, are exactly the same as those
in the centralized decision maker model of section 3. Consequently, as long as
transfers are strictly positive, the outcome of this game (the Nash-equilibrium
e¤ort and transfer choices) displays the same “local” properties as functions of
familial income and wage rate as the optimal choices emerging in the Barro-Becker
model. This is to say that, for small changes in (Ip;Ic;wc), where “small” indicates
that transfers remain positive after the changes takes place, equilibrium transfers,
consumption and e¤ort respond to these changes just like the optimal choices in
the Barro-Becker model did.
When transfers are zero, the child is solving the problem described in section 2.
In fact, the child’s best-response function, characterized by (4.2), coincides with
the child’s e¤ort choice in the model of section 2, given in (2.1), when transfers
are set to zero. The following results follow directly from (4.1) and (4.2).
Lemma 4.1. The child’sbestresponse function, ec (Ip;Ic;wc;Tp) = ec (Ic + Tp;wc),
is continuously di¤erentiable in all arguments. Moreover, ec;1 < 0, ec;2 > 0.
Lemma 4.2. The parent’s best response function Tp (Ip;Ic;wc;ec) is continuous
on all its arguments and Tp;1 ¸ 0, Tp;2 · 0, Tp;3 · 0 and Tp;4 · 0. When Tp > 0,
the previous inequalities hold strictly and Tp;1 ¡ Tp;2 = 1. Moreover, there is ¹ Ip
such that Tp (Ip;Ic;wc;ec) = 0, for Ip · ¹ Ip, and Tp (Ip;Ic;wc;ec) > 0, for Ip > ¹ Ip.




= (1 ¡¸)u1(Ic + wcec;1 ¡ ec).
From the properties of U (¢) and u(¢), ¹ Ip exists and is unique. The rest of the proof
follows from di¤erentiating (4.1), when Tp > 0, and from comparative statics,
otherwise. ¥
Lemma 4.2 states that positive transfers preserve the redistributive neutrality
property form the Barro-Becker model. Since parental transfers compensate for
the redistribution of exogenous sources of income which maintain (Ip + Ic) con-
stant, the child’s best response is also not to modify the e¤ort choice prevailing
before redistribution took place. Consequently, when transfers are positive, only
the total (Ip + Ic) a¤ects consumption and e¤ort outcomes, for a given wage rate
wc.
The following result is shown in the appendix.
11Lemma 4.3. The game ¡(Ip;Ic;wc) hasaunique, stable Nash-equilibrium(Tp;ec)
in pure strategies. The Nash-equilibrium transfer and e¤ort outcomes coincide
with those of the Barro-Becker model, when Tp > 0.
5. Private Information
In the previous sections, I have analyzed the properties of familial resource al-
location assuming that time spent at work is observed by parent and child. In
this section, I drop the assumption that the time the child spends working, ec, is
public: in the current setting, work e¤ort is assumed to be privately observed by
the child.
As it is standard in agency theory, the child’s e¤ort determines the distribution
of her income, higher e¤ort shifting the probability distribution towards higher
income values. Putting in more e¤ort bene…ts the child in that her income will
be higher, in expectation. It also bene…ts the altruistic parent, who transfers
resources to the child as a function of income di¤erentials: the child’s higher
expected income will require lower transfers from the parent, in expectation. In
this sense, the child’s e¤ort can be partly interpreted as a “transfer” to the parent.
Since e¤ort is costly and the child is sel…sh, she has no interest in bene…tting the
parent in any way. The assumptions below will make it such that the own bene…ts
from higher expected income will not su¢ce to induce the child to put in the high
e¤ort level, when she is receiving a transfer schedule similar to that of sections 3
and 4. As a consequence, the parent will have to modify this transfer schedule
in order to induce higher e¤ort from the child. Because the model deals with a
static setup, this deviation from the transfer schedule of previous sections is not
credible: the parent always prefers to resort to the transfer arrangement of the
Barro-Becker model, after output is realized. In fact, being able to deviate from
it involves commitment ability, on the part of the parent.
Chami [11] and Gatti [13] have also considered private information in the
context of the family. Chami compares the bene…ts for the parent of committing
to a …xed payment to the child — upon observing the outcome of her e¤ort — with
the transfer menu preferred by the parent without commitment. Gatti analyzes
several di¤erent transfer arrangements and their implications for the child’s choice
of e¤ort. The current section focuses on the properties of the transfer schedule
under parental commitment. Speci…cally, I will show that when e¤ort has to
be induced, the familiar insurance/incentives trade-o¤ causes the “redistributive
neutrality” of transfers to break-down.
125.1. The model
The child receives income stream Ic 2 R+. Her income is drawn from probabil-
ity distribution f (Ic;ec), de…ned over B(R+), where ec denotes the child’s work
time or e¤ort level. For simplicity, it is assumed that e¤ort can take values in
E = feH;eLg, eH > eL. The probability distribution f (¢;eH) …rst-order stochas-
tically dominates f (¢;eL). Parental income Ip 2 R+ is now also assumed to be
random and distributed according to probability density function ¹(¢), de…ned
over B(R+). Ip is assumed to be statistically independent from Ic.
The timing is as follows4. The child puts in e¤ort level ec 2 E. Endowments
(Ip;Ic) are drawn from ¹(¢)f (¢;e). After observing the endowment realizations,
the parent provides a non-negative transfer Tp (Ic;Ip) to the child. Given endow-
ments and transfer decision, familial consumption is given by:
cp = Ip ¡Tp (Ip;Ic)
and
cc = Ic + Tp (Ip;Ic):
The preferences of family members are the same as before and reproduced
below for convenience:
Up = ¸U (cp) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(cc;1 ¡ ec);
Uc = u(cc;1 ¡ec).
In this section, the constant ¸ is constrained to the interval (0:5;1] (see subsection
5.4).
Since transfers are given after the child’s income is realized, the optimal trans-
fer choice is given by:
¡¸U
0 (Ip ¡ Tp (Ip;Ic)) + (1 ¡ ¸)u1(Ic + Tp (Ip;Ic);1 ¡ ec) · 0, (5.1)
for all (Ip;Ic) pairs, with strict equality when Tp (Ip;Ic) > 0. In a static con-
text, therefore, the transfer schedule given in (5.1) is the only credible transfer
4Although, strictly speaking, there a timing issue associated with the setup of moral haz-
ard models, with the agent moving …rst and income being draw afterwards, this carries no
implications for the analysis of the current section. For simplicity alone, I will maintain the
simpler concept and notation of a Nash-equilibrium throughout, as opposed to that of subgame
perfection.
13arrangement the parent could announce. In order to give private information an
interesting role, I will assume that the parent would like to commit to a di¤erent
transfer payment, one that maximizes his expected utility. This if formally stated
in assumptions 6 and 7, below.
Let EIp;Ice denote the expectations operatorinduced by ¹(¢)f (¢;e). The trans-
fer schedule Tp (Ip;Ic) satis…es (5.1), when ec = eL. Then we have:
Assumption 6 The direct utility functions U (¢) and u(¢), the constant ¸, the
probability distributions f (¢;eH), f (¢;eL) and ¹(¢) are such that
EIp;IceLu(Ic + Tp (Ip;Ic);1 ¡eL) > EIp;IceHu(Ic + Tp (Ip;Ic);1 ¡ eH):
(5.2)
Assumption 7 The direct utility functions U (¢) and u(¢), the constant ¸, the
probability distributions f (¢;eH), f (¢;eL) and ¹(¢) are such that there exists
a transfer schedule ^ T (Ip;Ic) satisfying the following two conditions:
EIp;IceHu
³




















EIp;IceL f¸U (Ip ¡ Tp (Ip;Ic)) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(Ic + Tp (Ip;Ic);1 ¡ eL)g:
Equation (5.2) states that the child prefers the low e¤ort level when the parent
implements the transfer mechanism given in (5.1)5. In turn, (5.4) says that,
under ^ Tp (¢), the child weakly prefers to work hard. From (5.4), we know that
the parent prefers transfer mechanism ^ Tp (Ip;Ic) with hard work to T (Ip;Ic), with
low e¤ort. In the remainder of this section, I will use ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) to denote the best
compensation scheme, from the parent’s perspective, satisfying the conditions in
assumption 7.
5Assumption 6 is not entirely general in the following sense. The condition expressed in
(5.1) depends on the e¤ort level the child exerts. Consequently, transfers should depend on
ec: Tp (Ip;Ic;ec). In a more general way, assumption 6 should ensure that the child’s expected
utility under low e¤ort and transfer payments Tp (Ip;Ic;eL) exceeds her expected utility under
high e¤ort and Tp (Ip;Ic;eH). This could be incorporated in assumption 6 all though I have not
done so for notational simplicity.
14In what follows, I will con…ne attention to pure e¤ort strategies. Since (5.4)
holds strictly, from the continuity of U (¢) and u(¢) it can be shown that there ex-
ists a compensation schedule ¹ T "
p (Ip;Ic) such that the parent still prefers ¹ T"
p (Ip;Ic)
to T (Ip;Ic) and the child is strictly better o¤ selecting eH.
The transfer Tp (Ip;Ic), given in (5.1), is a dominant strategy for the parent,
among all possible compensation arrangements. From (5.2), the child will select
low e¤ort once faced with this payment arrangement. The following result follows
immediately.
Lemma 5.1. The static gamewith private information hasauniqueNash-equilibrium
in pure strategies, characterized by (eL;Tp (Ip;Ic)), where Tp (Ip;Ic) solves (5.1).
From (5.4), the parent would like to be able to commit to the transfer mech-
anism ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic), in order to induce eH. In the choice of ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic), however, the
incentive compatibility constraint (5.3) will bind (if private information is to have
a role in this problem). In turn, since (5.3) — which conveys the incentives to
high e¤ort — was not taken into account when deriving Tp (Ip;Ic), we expect
¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) 6= Tp (Ip;Ic), for some (Ip;Ic).
The transfer schedule Tp (Ip;Ic) displays the same redistributive neutrality
property stated in lemmas 3.1 and 4.2. When transfers are strictly positive and
income redistribution between parent and child leaves the family’s total income
unchanged, optimal transfer will o¤set redistribution, leaving familial consump-
tion intact. The transfer schedule ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic), however, is constrained to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint, equation (5.3), in order to induce high ef-
fort. When this constraint binds, it no longer follows that income redistribution is
neutral to the optimal allocation of resources, for ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) carries the well-know
trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives. This will be formally shown in the
next section.
5.2. Some Properties of Transfer Schedule ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic)
Here it is shown how the parental transfer ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) is a¤ected by income redis-
tribution which leaves total familial resources unchanged.
As stated above, ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) is the transfer arrangement which maximizes the
parent’s expected utility, subject to the child (weakly) preferring to work hard.











Ic + ~ Tp (Ip;Ic);1 ¡ eH
´o
15subject to the child’s incentive compatibility constraint, equation (5.3).
Pointwise maximization with respect to Tp (¢) yields:
¡¸U
0 (cp) + u1(cc;1 ¡ eH)
·










where the above expression holds at equality for ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) > 0. The non-negative
number µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (5.3). Denote by F (Ic) the
ratio of probabilities f (Ic;eL)=f (Ic;eH), know as the likelihood ratio. Similarly,
let U1(cc) denote the ratio of marginal utilities u1(cc;1 ¡eL)=u1(cc;1 ¡ eH). For
(Ic;Ip) pairs such that transfers are strictly positive, we may rewrite (5.5) as:
¸U
0 (cp) = u1(cc;1 ¡ eH)[(1 ¡ ¸) + µ (1 ¡ U1(cc)F (Ic))]: (5.6)
When µ = 0 (the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind), we naturally
recover the transfer rule given in (5.1). For µ > 0, departures from the preferred
parental transfer arrangement occur when the product U1(cc)F (Ic) is di¤erent
than 1. The likelihood ratio F (¢) has a familiar interpretation. The term U1(¢)
corrects the statistical inference associated with F (¢) by transforming it into mar-
ginal utility units. When u12 > 0, U1(cc) > 1, implying that the consequences
of shirking (taking e¤ort eL rather than eH) are penalized more acutely. This
is so since taking the low e¤ort level implies that the child’s marginal utility is
higher than when she works hard. Conversely, when u12 < 0, evidence of shirking
is not punished so severely since it reduces the marginal utility from consump-
tion. When the child’s utility function is separable in consumption and leisure,
U1(¢) = 1, and this factor vanishes.
In order to see how the optimal transfer ¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) is a¤ected by income redis-
tribution, I will perform the following experiment. Take an income pair (Ip;Ic) for
which transfers are strictly positive and considersubtracting ± > 0 fromthe child’s
income, and giving this amount to the parent. Assume that ¹ Tp (Ip + ±;Ic ¡ ±) > 0.
Fully di¤erentiating (5.6) and rearranging, we get:
d¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) =
µ
1 ¡




where D, the denominator in the previous expression, is given by:
D = ¸U




16In this case, therefore, neutrality does not hold: d¹ Tp (Ip;Ic) 6= ±. The sign
of the ratio in (5.7) hinges on the signs of F 0(¢) and U0
1(¢). F 0(¢) < 0 is a
su¢cient condition for f (¢;eH) to …rst-order stochastically dominate f (¢;eL). The
derivative of the ratio U1(¢) does not seem to have a particularly meaningful
interpretation. Having F 0 (¢) < 0 and U0
1(¢) > 0 is su¢cient for dTp (Ip;Ic) < 1.
This implies that transfers less than fully compensate for income redistribution,
a result that has been consistently found in the empirical literature, as discussed
in section 6.
5.3. Interpretation
It was shown that the transfer schedule under commitment does not have the
redistributive neutrality property. The driving forces of this result are the fact
that the child’s income is endogenous — in the sense that the distribution of in-
come depends on her choice of action, the non-obervability of e¤ort — so that
parental transfers do not have e¤ort as an argument, and the parent’ ability to
commit. In previous sections, although the child also had to decide how much
time to spend working, wages and income were exogenously given to both family
members. Because the parent cares about the child in a non-distortionary way,
conditioning on a transfer amount, parent and child would always agree on the
amount of time the child would spend in the labor market. Consequently, the
parent would not use any commitment device, even if he had access to such a pos-
sibility: the transfer schedule he would choose under commitment would coincide
with that one provided in sections 3 and 4. In the current setup, higher e¤ort
has a component of transfer from the child to the parent. The (rather standard)
assumptions imposed above make it such that parent and child’s preferred e¤ort
levels are di¤erent. In other words, the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
Additionally, if e¤ort was observed, the parent would design a transfer schedule
including e¤ort as an argument. Given the child’s e¤ort, the parent’s preferred
transfer schedule (with or without commitment ability) would verify redistribu-
tive neutrality6. When e¤ort is not observed, transfers depend only on observable
income. Still, without commitment, once output has been realized, the parent’s
preferred transfer schedule veri…es redistributive neutrality. It is the parent’s abil-
ity to commit that enables him to implement a transfer schedule yielding a higher
6This requires the additional assumption that the transfer schedule with redistributive neu-
trality provides the child with expected utility at least as high as that of receiving no transfers
at all.
17expected utility. Neutrality breaks down, in this case, due to the typical trade-
o¤ between insurance and incentives from agency theory: income realizations are
perceived di¤erent (therefore, non-neutral) according to the likelihood that high
versus low e¤ort was associated with each individual outcome.
While the parent’s ability to commit is unappealing in a static setup, it can
be more easily justi…ed in view of repeated interaction between parent and child.
However, a …nite horizon may lead to unraveling and the repetition of the sta-
tic dominant strategies, whereas dynamic games with in…nite horizons are know
to have many subgame perfect equilibria. Also, although parental commitment
would not have altered the outcome of the Barro-Becker model (since the par-
ent would want to induce the e¢cient e¤ort choice from the child), the child’s
e¤ort choice would be di¤erent if she had commitment ability, both in the Barro-
Becker setup and the private information model. Consequently, one may question
the pertinence of the speci…c transfer schedule ¹ T (Ip;Ic) proposed above. While
this choice is certainly arbitrary, the properties of ¹ T (Ip;Ic) are consistent with a
number of empirical regularities discussed below.
The endogenous consideration of labor supply — sections 3 and 4 — showed
that“redistributiveneutrality”isan ill-de…nedexperimentwith respectto changes
in labor income. In fact, family members adjust their labor supply decisions once
faced with changes in wages. Consequently, there is no reason to expect resource
allocation to be invariant to such modi…cations. The standard private informa-
tion setup involves a single e¤ort decision associated with di¤erent realizations
of income. In this context, changes in the child’s income are not associated with
changes in “wages” and subsequent labor supply adjustment. Neutrality was
shown to break down due to the di¤erent “information” associated with di¤erent
income realizations.
Realistically, the distribution of most sources of income (including wage in-
come) depends on privately observed actions. As such, the insurance/incentives
trade-o¤ examined in this section is likely to characterize intra-family transfers in
general, including transfers targeted towards variation in labor income. In [12],
I suggested “controlling” for private information by examining whether truly ex-
ogenous events, such as accidents or one’s house burning down, trigger a di¤erent
transfer response compared to ordinary changes in income. This issue is taken up
in section 6.2, below.
185.4. Private Information and Altruism
It is important to notice that asymmetric information has the potential to a¤ect
familial resource allocation only to the extent that family members have con‡ict-
ing preferences over consumption and leisure. Consider, for example, two-sided
altruism, where the parent cares about the child and the child cares about the
parent. One could model the child’s preferences as
Uc = (1 ¡¸)Up + ¸u(cc;1 ¡ ec);
so that the child attaches weight ¸ to her direct utility from consumption and
leisure, and the complement 1¡¸ to the parent’s utility from consumption. When
altruism is partial (family members value their direct utility more than the utility
of relatives), ¸ exceeds 0.5. However, strong altruism, with ¸ = 0:5, implies
that parent and child are unanimous in their choice of consumption and leisure.
Consequently, the fact that the child’s e¤ort is privately observed would have
no bearing on the family’s consumption and e¤ort choices. In other words, no
incentive compatibility constraint would bind if parent and child had identical
preferences.
6. Statistical Model
In this section, I write down the statistical model corresponding to the Barro-
Becker model, presented in section 3. The model is then confronted with actual
empirical estimates from the literature.
6.1. The Model
Previous sections provided a stylized theory of familial transfers and resource al-
location. The models implicitly considered a “representative” family, since no
mention was made to household speci…c characteristics. When looking at data,
it is imperative to take such diversity into account. This section describes the
implications of the Barro-Becker model for transfer data from a cross-section
survey panel, explicitly considering household heterogeneity as described by de-
mographic elements. Given assumptions on how demographic variables a¤ect
household choices, the model of section 3 enables full speci…cation of the features
of transfer and consumption data which would emerge from a cross-section sample
of households.
19Consider a statistical population of interest, for example the households living
in the US, in year t. Since we want to eventually look into familial transfers,
it is convenient to specialize the population of interest by con…ning attention
to households linked by kinship. In particular, I will simplify the analysis by
assuming that thepopulation can be divided intoparent and adult-child household
pairs. Each parent and child household pair forms a data point of the population
of interest.
Households di¤er according to demographic variables such as the number of
household members, the age, sex and marital status of its members. The vec-
tor of demographic characteristics for family i in the population, in year t, will
be denoted Xit = (Xpi;t;Xci;t). This vector contains the demographic charac-
teristics of the parental household, Xpi;t, as well as the child’s, Xci;t. Wage rates
Wit = (wpi;t;wci;t) and exogenous familial income Iit = (Ipi;t;Ici;t) are other sources
of diversity across households. Finally, households di¤er with respect to unobserv-
ables, subsumed in uit.
Demographic characteristics, wages, exogenous income sources and unobserv-
ables are distributed in the population of families according to probability distri-
bution function p(Xt;Wt;It;ut). The data available is assumed to be a random
draw from the population of interest, consisting of N parent-child observations of
(X;W;I) for each sample year.
Let T¤
p denote the desired transfer from parent to child, the optimal transfer
choice from the Barro-Becker as described in section 3. Omitting subscripts i and




p = ® + ¯1Ip + ¯2Ic + °1wp + °2wc + ±pXp + ±cXc + u (6.1)
The linear representation of transfers presented in (6.1) is not a limitation since
non-linear functional forms can be easily accommodated by including additional
regressors in the powers of the explanatory variables.
7The model of section 4 did not consider the choice of parental labor supply. By including
the parent’s wage in the empirical equation (6.1), I am considering here the more realistic gener-
alization of the model, with parents participating in the labor market, earning wage wp. I have
derived all the results concerning how transfers, time at work and familial consumption vary
with income and wages for this model, when utility is separable in consumption and leisure and
parent and child have the same momentary utility function. The results are simply generaliza-
tions, in the natural way, of those presented in lemmas 3.1 through 3.4. Interesting extensions
include @ep=@wc < 0 and @ec=@wp < 0.
20From the altruism model with two decision makers, desired transfers are ob-
served when actual transfers are positive. That is, if Tp is the actual parental
transfer to the child, T ¤
p = Tp whenever Tp > 0.
In order to estimate the parameters of interest, one possible approach is to
make an assumption concerning the distribution of the error component u. Given
the censored transfer data, a Tobit model seems especially appropriate. One could
therefore assume that u is normally distributed, u s N (0;¾2), and proceed to
estimate the parameters in (6.1).
So far, I have implicitly assumed that (¯1;¯2) (as well as (°1;°2) ) are identical
across households. They are functions of the coe¢cient of partial altruism ¸,
among other utility parameters. However, one would expect the degree of altruism
to vary across families. Also, since the data concerns di¤erent families, u is
likely to be heteroskedastic. Tobit estimation procedures can be modi…ed to
accommodate both random coe¢cients and heteroskedasticity. A more ‡exible
estimator, robust to the functional form relating the utility of family members
to consumption and to observed and unobserved preference characteristics, has
been derived in Altonji and Ichimura [4] and used in Altonji et al. [3]. I will
maintain the standard Tobit model as the benchmark procedure since it has been
extensively used in most of the empirical work I wish to address.
The model of section 3 of course suggests that ¯1 > 0 and ¯2 < 0: a wealthier
parent wishes to provide a higher transfer while the desired transfer is lower
towards a less needy child. In fact, ¯1 corresponds to the Barro-Becker transfer
derivative with respect to parental income, @Tp=@Ip. Similarly, ¯2 is the empirical
model equivalent of @Tp=@Ic. The redistributive neutrality of the model without
asymmetric information additionally imposes ¯1¡¯2 = 1. With respect to wages,
the model predicts °1 > 0 and °2 < 0.
6.2. Results from the Empirical Literature
A substantial part of recent empirical work on altruism has devoted attention
to the properties of …nancial and time transfers between parents and their adult
children. Some examples of this literature include Altonji et al. [2], [3], McGarry
and Schoeni [17], [18], Cox [8], Cox and Raines [9] and Cox and Rank [10]. Of par-
ticular interest, from the point of view of altruism, is the concern about whether
or not …nancial transfers are increasing in the income of the donor and decreasing
in the recipient’s. Another empirically examined property of transfers, presumed
to hold under the null hypothesis of altruism, is redistributive neutrality.
21The properties of transfers have been analyzed using versions of equation (6.1)
of the following form:
T
¤




c + d1Xp + d2Xc + v; (6.2)
where the superscript S indicates total income: the sum of labor and non-labor
income. The child’s total income, in the notation of section 3, is then IS
c =
Ic + wcec. Thorough empirical experimentation has estimated 6.2 using several
di¤erent possibilities for the income variables, including current and permanent
income. All the references cited above have found evidence that the probability
of a transfer being provided depends positively and in a signi…cant way in the
donor’s income, and depends signi…cantly on the recipient’s income, although
with a negative coe¢cient. Concerning amounts given, with the exception of Cox
[8], Cox and Raines [9], and Cox and Rank [10]8, actual transfers were found to
display the same sign pattern as the probability that one was given.
In all the work cited here, although the topic is only seriously considered in
Altonji et al. [3], reference has been made to the redistributive neutrality test.
Redistributive neutrality has been interpreted as the statement that the di¤erence
between the transfer derivatives with respect to parent and child’s income should
equal unity. Using the notation of the test equation above, this translates into
b1 ¡b2 = 1.
In section 3, when characterizing the properties of transfers, it was stressed
that income redistribution within the family was neutral with respect to resource
allocation only when non-labor income redistribution was considered. Under the
assumption that parent and child can adjust their working hours in response to
changes in wages or exogenous income sources, redistribution of labor-income
is not a well-de…ned experiment, in general. In fact, if parent and child face
di¤erent wage rates, they will engage in di¤erent adjustments of their labor force
participation when faced with changes in their labor income. This is so even when
utility is separable in consumption and leisure as changes in income or wages still
induce adjustments in labor force participation in that particular case9.
8See Fernandes [12] on estimation procedures — generalized Tobit — and potential problems
with the datasets used in [8], [9] and [10].
9Although there is no reason to expect neutrality with respect to labor income, when labor
supply is endogenously determined, I tried to check whether @Tp=@Ic = @Tp=@wc, for some
functional forms. For log utility, with U (c) = log(c) and u(c;1 ¡ e) = log(c) + log(1 ¡ e),
the previous equality does indeed hold. For more general speci…cations, with U (c) = c® and
u(c;1 ¡ e) = c® + (1 ¡ e)
¯, ® 6= ¯, @Tp=@Ic 6= @Tp=@wc.
22The Barro-Becker model (section 3), enables us to relate the parameter of
interest concerning redistributive neutrality, the coe¢cient ¯2 in equation (6.1),
with the parameter actually estimated, b2, from equation (6.2). The child’s total
income relates to labor income as follows:
I
S
c = Ic + wcec:
Suppose that the exogenous component of IS
c is very small, so that most of the
changesin IS
c aredue tochangesin wagesand laborforce subsequent adjustment10.
Then, changes in IS

























From the model of section 3, desired transfers depend on the wage rate as well
as on the exogenous income components, Ip and Ic. Consider the expression for















10Whether or not Ic is small does not a¤ect the substance of the results presented here, while
simplifying the exposition.
11The more general expression, derived for the model when the parent also participates in
the labor market, is as follows. The parental utility function U (cp) is now replaced by u(cp) +
v (1 ¡ep), where ep denotes time spent at work by the parent and u(¢) and v(¢) have the usual
properties. The child’s utility function u(cc;1¡ ec) is specialized to assume separability and


























p denoting the second derivative of the parent’s utility from consumption, and similarly for
the other terms. Considering instead the simpler expression provided in (6.5) is consistent with
the Barro-Becker model presented in section 3 and does not qualitatively alter the subsequent
discussion.

















Leaving aside the implications of using the functional form in (6.2) to estimate
the transfer function in (6.1), one may think of the number given in (6.5) as the
expression that was actually estimated12. Recall that the redistributive neutrality
property applies to the term @Tp=@Ic. In fact, the model of an altruistic parent
and his child predicts @Tp=@Ip ¡ @Tp=@Ic = 1. Using the notation of the test















It is worth comparing the actual estimate b2 with ¯2. The term in brackets
is more negative than @Tp=@Ic, from the assumption that leisure is normal. On
the other hand, to the extent that the elasticity of labor supply is positive (neg-
ative), this reduces (raises) the magnitude of actual estimates. If the e¤ect of
the labor supply elasticity dominates, in the sense of outweighing the e¤ect of
the second parcel of (6.5), then b2 will be strictly smaller than ¯2, in absolute
value. Since neutrality tests have been performed by computing the di¤erence
@Tp=@IS
p ¡ @Tp=@IS
c , and the estimates of @Tp=@IS
c have been found to be nega-
tive, “compressed” estimates of @Tp=@IS
p and @Tp=@IS
c due to the dampening e¤ect
of the labor supply wage elasticity could help explain the very low value of the
“test” results, which have been found to be signi…cantly below unity. Although
estimates of male labor supply wage elasticities tend to be negative (around -0.1),
female labor supply elasticities are positive and more elastic (around 0.2)13. The
number ´ represents the wage elasticity of the child’s household. As such, when
head and spouse are present, it will not correspond exactly to any of these es-
timates but instead it re‡ects their joint hours and labor market participation
response to wage changes.
The introduction of private information in the model proposed in section 5 was
shown to cause neutrality to break down. As argued above, the distribution of
most sources of income (including wage income) is likely to depend on privately
12The actual estimate, without the assumption that Ic is small, would be an weighted average
of the coe¢cient presented in (6.5) and @Tp=@Ic.
13See Borjas [7], pp. 68.
24observed actions. Consequently, the insurance/incentives trade-o¤ will also be
present in the transfer response to income changes. Observing transfer responses
targeted to exogenous events could provide both a test of the quantitative rele-
vance of asymmetric information as well as a test of the Barro-Becker model of
altruism.
Villanueva [19] uses the PSID to test a version of equation (6.2), augmented
to consider income losses due to involuntary unemployment, as well as income
losses due to disability. In a Tobit regression (see table 14 of [19]), the derivative
of parental transfers associated with a one dollar reduction in the income of the
child’s household head is 11 cents, when a dummy is included to control for income
loss due to a layo¤. The coe¢cient associated with the dummy variable is 0.2.
Consequently, income loss due to a layo¤ raises the total transfer from 11 to
approximately 30 cents, for a one dollar reduction in the child’s income. When a
dummy is included for income loss due to disability, instead, the initial transfer
derivative of 12 cents is raised by 18 cents, again totalling 30 cents. These numbers
imply that the transfer derivative goes up by a factor of 2.5-3, once “asymmetric
information” is taken into account.
Going back to the expression for @Tp=@IS
c , a lower bound on ´, the wage
elasticity of labor supply, may obtained as follows. Assumed that the response of





Assume further that the wage elasticity of labor supply is identical in the house-
holds of parent and child. Under these assumptions:




Villanueva’s estimates of b1 ¡ b2, corrected for “asymmetric information,” are
about 0.33. A similar magnitude is obtained by multiplying estimates of b1 ¡






In order to square these numbers with redistributive neutrality (¯1 ¡¯2 = 1), we
need ´ ' 2.
25Indirect evidence on private information is additionally provided in Jensen [14].
He analyzes the response of remittances from family members who migrated from
rural communities to cities, how these remittances respond to di¤erent income
sources. He …nds that the derivative of transfers with respect to income receipts
from public programs exceeds, by orders of magnitude, the transfer derivative
when other income sources change14. This corroborates the possibility that in-
centives are an important part of transfer response to income variation.
From the parent’s best-response function in the model of two decision makers,
the transfer choice which solves equation (4.1), we obtain transfers as functions
of e¤ort as well as the child’s total income. With e¤ort …xed, transfers display
the redistributive neutrality property: the parent would compensate a one dollar
reduction in the child’s total income matched with a one dollar increment in
his own income by raising transfers exactly one dollar. Consequently, tests of
redistributive neutrality could be performed by enlarging the test equation (6.2)
to include (instruments for) the time spent in the labor market by parent and
child, respectively ep and ec. There is an attempt to control for time at work in
some of the empirical work cited here. In both papers by McGarry and Schoeni,
[17] and [18], the regressors include dummies for the cases in which the child is
working full time or when she is not working/missing. For the parent, a dummy
is included for data points where the head/spouse is not employed. The authors
report that the results reject redistributive neutrality. In Altonji et al. [2], dummy
variables for hours in unemployment (two categorical measures) are included for
parent and child. They also report the rejection of redistributive neutrality.
In Altonji et al. [1], redistributive neutrality was tested using consumption
data. Under the assumption that altruistic family members pool resources, their
marginal utility from consumption would be common across family members. It
could, therefore, be estimated as a …xed e¤ect. Altonji et al. regress individual
consumption of family members on the family’s total income, the income of the
particular individual corresponding to that consumption information, as well as
on a vector of demographic values. In order to take the endogenous choice of
working hours into account, I would stress the results they present in Table 4,
where the wage rates of husband and wife are controlled for. Still, as in all
the other estimates they present, the coe¢cient on non-labor income is positive
and signi…cant. This result corroborates the empirical failure of redistributive
14The lowest ratio of the transfer derivative in response to a reduction in pension income
(presumably publicly observed) over the transfer derivative in response to reductions in total
familial income is about 2. However, he provides estimates in which this ratio is as high as 10.
26neutrality.
6.3. Additional Empirical Implications
Other testable implications of the Barro-Becker model include the fact that in-
come and wage elasticities vary with the transfer regime. Consider, for example,
the response of the child’s e¤ort ec when her exogenous income Ic changes. When
transfers are zero, the child will respond to higher individual income — under a
normality assumption — by reducing her labor supply and increasing consump-
tion. When transfers are positive, the child’s higher income will be “shared” by
the parent in the form of a reduced transfer. In fact, assuming that parental con-
sumption is also a normal good, the parent will reduce his initial transfer. In net
terms (from the assumption that the child’s consumption and leisure are normal),
the child’s total resources after transfers are still higher than before the change in
Ic; however, they are lower than the initial increment in Ic by the amount corre-
sponding to the increment in parental consumption. Consequently, the reduction
in the child’s labor supply in response to identical changes in Ic will be smaller
when she receives transfers from the parent than otherwise.
This can be formally shown by comparing the derivatives @ec=@Ic when trans-
fers are positive and when they are zero. Let @e0
c=@Ic denote the change in e¤ort
when no transfers are provided, and let @e+
c =@Ic denote the e¤ort response when
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Again, the di¤erence in elasticities across transfer regimes can be empirically
tested.
7. Conclusion
This paper has stressed the role of endogenous labor supply in the resource al-
location of altruistic families. A full characterization of the family’s choices has
been provided. Initially, work e¤ort was assumed to be public. This assumption
was later relaxed to consider e¤ort choices privately observed by individual family
members.
It was shown that endogenous labor supply has important implications for
the consequences of income redistribution within the family. In particular, given
the allocative implications of wage rates for the choice of labor supply, income
redistribution involving changes in labor income alters the family’s consumption
and leisure choices and, consequently, it is not neutral. Income redistribution
involving exogenous income sources alone still displays “redistributive neutrality,”
as long as work e¤ort is publicly observed. In fact, when e¤ort is privately known
only by the worker, redistributive neutrality breaks down entirely.
The results derived here were used to confront empirical estimates in the lit-
erature. I have claimed that, to the extent that families — in the real world —
adjust labor supply to changes in income or wages, the empirical evidence does
not necessarily lead to a rejection of altruism. Moreover, even when the ability to
adjust labor supply is small, by causing redistributive neutrality to break-down,
asymmetric information still suggests qualitative implications that correspond to
the empirical …ndings.
Endogenous consideration of labor supply also suggests a number of testable
empirical implications. In fact, the model predicts that consumption and labor
supply elasticities vary with the transfer regime prevailing in the family. Stated
di¤erently, when intra-family transfers are positive, labor supply and consumption
28choices in one household depend on the income and wages of members of other
kinship related households. One example is the less elastic response of labor
supply and consumption to changes in income, when transfers are positive. Other
empirical implications concern the di¤erent response of transfers with respect to
hazardous events, such as personal illness or accident, versus ordinary changes in
labor income.
Summing up, this paper contributes to a broader understanding of the impli-
cations of altruism for resource allocation by providing a complete description of
the altruistic family’s choices when labor supply is endogenously determined. It
also provides a better understanding of the consequences of redistributing income
across cohorts. The e¤ects of income redistribution are at the core of a number of
extremely important policy issues, namely whether or not Ricardian Equivalence
holds or the e¤ectiveness of welfare programs. While is it know that Ricardian
Equivalence holds only when taxes and subsidies are lump-sum, by making ex-
plicit the consequences of income redistribution for labor supply, this paper helps
assess the deviations from Ricardo’s neutrality result for a policy involving (distor-
tionary) personal income taxation. Similarly, the model helps us understand the
consequences for labor supply and transfer decisions triggered in family members
who were providing …nancial help to relatives, if their relatives become welfare
recipients.
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A. The Child’s Problem
I characterize here the child’s choice of e¤ort, when she acts as a single decision
maker, not receiving transfers from the parent. The properties of the implied
consumption values are also presented. Recall that corner solutions (ec = 0) have
been ruled out, for simplicity.






c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
< 0; (A.1)
where the inequality follows from assumption 1, parts i) and ii). As for changes




(u21 ¡ u11wc)ec ¡ u1
u11w2
c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
> 0; (A.2)
the inequality following from assumption 1, part i), and assumption 2.
Given the properties of u(¢), the optimal e¤ort choice ec (Ic;wc) is a con-
tinuously di¤erentiable function on all arguments. If corner solutions had been
allowed, then for income and wage rates (Ic;wc) such that the …rst-order condition
(2.1) holds at equality with exactly zero hours at work, the optimal choice func-
tion ec (Ic;wc) would have a kink. Consequently, it would only be di¤erentiable
away from those income and wage pairs.
The child’s consumption is derived from her resource constraint:







c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
> 0;
31where the inequality follows from assumption 1, parts i) and ii). Changes in the




ec (u22 ¡ u12wc) ¡ u1wc
u11w2
c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
> 0;
the inequality following from assumption 1, partsi) and iii). Optimal consumption
cc (Ic;wc) is also a continuously di¤erentiable function of all arguments. If ec = 0
had been allowed, this function would have kinks for the (Ic;wc) pairs described
above.
B. The Barro-Becker Model with E¤ort
Here, I derive the Hessian matrix of the Barro-Becker model presented in section
3.
B.1. The Hessian Matrix
Let A be the Hessian matrix associated with the Barro-Becker model, A =
faijgi;j=1;2. A is as follows:
A =
·
(1 ¡ ¸)u11 + ¸U00 (1 ¡ ¸)(u11wc ¡ u12)
u11wc ¡ u12 u11w2
c + u22 ¡ 2u12wc
¸
:
From the properties of the direct utility functions u(¢) and U (¢), a11 < 0. After





c + u22 ¡ 2u12wc
¢







B.2. Proof of Lemmas
Proof of lemmas 3.1 through 3.4.
In the text, it was stated that only ec > 0 would be considered, for simplicity.
Then, the properties of u(¢) and U (¢) ensure that Tp (Ip;Ic;wc) and ec (Ip;Ic;wc)
are continuously di¤erentiable functions of all arguments. This properties carries
over to cp and cc, given in (3.2) and (3.1).
Transfer and e¤ort properties follow from fully di¤erentiating the system of





c + u22 ¡ 2u12wc
jAj
¸U
00 > 0; (B.1)

























+ u1(u11wc ¡ u12)
¤
< 0; (B.3)
the inequality following from assumption 1, part ii), and assumption 3.
Simple algebra shows that Tp;1 ¡ Tp;2 = 1:
u11w2






















00 < 0; (B.4)
















[u1((1 ¡ ¸)u11 + ¸U
00) + ¸U
00ec (u11wc ¡u21)] > 0; (B.6)
from assumptions 3 and 4.






































00 > 0; (B.10)
















where I have used the fact that Tp;1 ¡ Tp;2 = 1 and @ec=@Ip = @ec=@Ic.











¸U00 [(u22 ¡ u12wc)ec ¡ u1wc] ¡u1u12(1 ¡ ¸)
jAj
> 0;
the inequality following from assumption 5. ¥














C. A Family with Two Decision Makers
Here, I characterize the properties of the best-response functions of parent and
child, corresponding to the model of section 4.
C.1. Best-Response Functions
Proof of lemma 4.1. The child’s best-response function is fully characterized
from her …rst-order condition, equation (4.2). This condition is exactly the same
as the child’s …rst-order condition in the problem of section 2, equation (3.4).
Consequently, the results of lemma 2.1 apply. ¥
Proof of lemma 4.2. The properties Tp;1 ¸ 0, Tp;2 · 0 and Tp;3 · 0 are
obvious. To show Tp;4 · 0, consider the derivative of the child’s marginal utility
from consumption with respect to change in e¤ort:
@
@ec
[u1(Ic + Tp + ecwc;1 ¡ ec)] = u11wc ¡ u12:
34From assumption 1, part ii), this derivative is negative. When Tp = 0, therefore,
the parent’s best response to increments in e¤ort is simply to let transfers stay at
zero: positive transfers would make his …rst-order condition even more negative.




(u12 ¡ u11wc)(1 ¡ ¸)
¸U00 + (1 ¡ ¸)u11
< 0;
where the inequality follows form assumption 1, part ii). ¥
C.2. Uniqueness and Stability of Nash-Equilibrium
Proof of lemma 4.3. Consider …rst the case Tp > 0. Di¤erentiating (4.1), we
get the parent’s best response to changes in e¤ort:
dTp =
(1 ¡ ¸)(u12 ¡ u11wc)
¸U00 + (1 ¡¸)u11
dec: (C.1)





c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
dTp: (C.2)
From assumption 1, part ii), we know that (u12 ¡ u11wc) > 0. This implies that
the slope of the parental best-response function is negative. Assumption 1, part
i), ensures that the denominator of the child’s best-response function is negative,
which carries over to the slope dec=dTp, as well. Uniqueness and stability of the
Nash-equilibrium requires that the modulus of the derivative dTp=dec, computed
along the parent’s best-response function (equation (C.1)), is smaller than the
modulus of dTp=dec computed along the child’s best-response function (C.2). This
implies:
u11w2
c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
u21 ¡u11wc
<
(1 ¡ ¸)(u12 ¡ u11wc)





c ¡ 2u12wc + u22
¢
(¸U
00 + (1 ¡ ¸)u11) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(u21 ¡ u11wc)
2 > 0;
which is exactly the condition that the determinant of the Hessian matrix in
the Barro-Becker problem be positive. Assumption 1, part i), and assumption 3
35deliver the previous inequality. Consider now the case when Tp = 0. As previously
stated, the child’s best-response is uniquely de…ned for zero transfers. For Tp = 0
to be optimal, it must be the case that
¡¸U
0 (Ip) + (1 ¡ ¸)u1(Ic + wcec;1 ¡ ec) · 0:
Consider perturbations of the Nash-equilibrium. If ec goes above its optimal level,
then the child’s marginal utility from consumption u1 decreases. This makes the
previous inequality more negative so that Tp = 0 remains a best-response for
the parent. Transfers being zero, the child’s optimal e¤ort choice is the one
prevailing before the perturbation took place. Consider now a reduction in e¤ort,
below the child’s optimal choice, still with Tp = 0. Since lower e¤ort raises the
child’s marginal utility from consumption, it may be the case that the parent
wants to start providing a strictly positive transfer. This being the case, we may
invoke the stability conditions veri…ed when transfers are positive. If, however,
the parent’s best response to the perturbation in e¤ort is to still set T p = 0, the
child’s best-response is to set ec to the e¤ort choice which prevailed before the
perturbation took place. Finally, consider a perturbation of the Nash-equilibrium
by increasing transfers. The child’s best response to positive transfers is to work
less. The parental best response to lower e¤ort is to reduce transfers. Therefore,
the original equilibrium is restored. ¥
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